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This paper puts the most fundamental philological operation
into the center of the theory of culture: the seemingly trivial act
of recognizing the shape of a letter in the “ornamental” abun-
dance of the material text. Culture is described as a comprehen-
sive term for all mechanisms, which interrelate social events with
their “scripts,” that is to say, with their proto-textual founda-
tions. Culture continuously, but variably, determines what is
actually signiﬁcant in the potential ornaments of “social text.”
The common quest of philology and cultural studies is to re-eval-
uate this text’s seemingly ornamental details and to uncover their
signiﬁcance. In order to reunite these only seemingly opposi-
tional approaches, literary scholarship must put genuinely philo-
logical operations in the center of its methodological repertoire.
Keywords: Philology, culture, ﬁgure/ornament, text, interpretation, art.
The invention of “culture” in the eighteenth century has eminently chan-
ged the way Western society looks at itself as well as “other” societies
(see Williams 1958, Perpeet 1984, Luhmann 1995). Still the usefulness of
the concept may be contested: Culture is far from being conclusively
deﬁned, and it is evident that the insistence on so-called cultural identi-
ties fuels some of the most diﬃcult conﬂicts of the present – when, for
example, human rights violations are defended as cultural peculiarities
against a Western public that holds human rights to be universal. This
paper concedes that many applications of the term may indeed be
unhelpful or misleading. But it holds that a concise account of the con-
cept can still uncover new perspectives – the exploration of which needs
philological means.
The argument is driven by the strategic claim that the opposition
between philology and cultural studies (in the broadest sense of the
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term), which often grounds discussions in literary scholarship, is not
relevant beyond the tactics of scholarly competition. On the contrary,
many “cultural turns” we have seen in recent decades have been stimu-
lated by a philological impulse: the scrupulous care for seemingly “orna-
mental” details, and the re-evaluation of their potential signiﬁcance. This
paper’s central claim is that philology’s fascination with reading orna-
ment unalterably links it to those mechanisms we are used to subsume
under the term “culture.” A reassessment of the culture concept in philo-
logical terms is therefore enriching for both sides. It might even help to
overcome the division between “literary criticism” on the one hand and
Literaturwissenschaft (“science of literature”) on the other, for both the
critically engaged assessment of literature and culture and its “scientiﬁc”
study must cultivate the ornamental, “material” basis of (social) text if
they want to establish any stability of meaning – which at the same time,
and by precisely this recursion to the “material” basis, is once more
opened up to further questioning.1
In the following, I propose to put the most fundamental philological
operation, the seemingly trivial act of recognizing the shape of a letter in
the ornamental abundance of the sensual data to be observed in the
material text, into the center of the theory of textuality and communica-
tion (II). This leads to a philological description of culture, giving the
metaphor of “reading culture” an alternative foundation (III), and
ﬁnally highlighting the function and signiﬁcance of literary scholarship
in society (IV). I start with some preliminary remarks concerning my
concept of philology and its relation to the diﬀerence between text and
communication as it has been described by modern sociological and
philological theories (I).
I. Preliminaries: Philology, text, and communication
In literary scholarship, there is an established division of labor between
the editorial constitution and the interpretation of text. This gap is wide
open even today, although already in the 1950s scholars such as Windfuhr
claimed that “edition is interpretation” (Windfuhr 1957, 440: “Edition ist
Interpretation”).2 According to the unspoken dogma that underlies this
separation, textual criticism is concerned with deciphering documents and
making them available in scholarly editions. Its “positivistic” approach
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treats the word “only” as an object, while for interpretation it is subject
to the perils of hermeneutic questioning.3 In recent years, however, edito-
rial endeavors in medieval and modern philology as well as recent devel-
opments in media studies called this division of labor into question. In the
1990s, for example, “new” or “material” philology proposed to base the
interpretation of medieval text solely on its original and therefore highly
variable “material” basis instead of reading the seemingly stable texts con-
stituted by professional editors. The proposal reconsidered the editorial
diﬃculties that arise when one aims to constitute a text without neglecting
the degree of variability (Cerquiglini 1989, 54, 120: “variance”)4 its diﬀer-
ent manuscripts incorporate. The claim was that medieval text does not
constitute unity in spite of variance, but consists of nothing but this vari-
ance. Accordingly, the new philologists’ solution for editorial problems
was to drop the goal of establishing a “canonical” version of medieval
text altogether, putting emphasis instead on the meaningful variance itself,
and thus also basing interpretation on inherently unstable text.5 Many
other editorial projects, including the Frankfurt Ho¨lderlin edition and
digital endeavors such as the projects united in NINES (www.nines.org)
as well as a whole strain of book history have since strengthened and fur-
ther developed new philology’s impulse against the dichotomy of edition
and interpretation.6
I would like to claim, however, that this impulse is actually part of an
undercurrent that has maintained pivotal inﬂuence for a long time. Textual
criticism has in fact always been driven by scrupulous skepticism against
textual stability, and innovative interpretations have always drawn on the
unrest provided by this skepticism.7 The editorial projects of Renaissance
humanism already combined new interpretative interests with an enor-
mous eﬀort to reconstitute the texts of antiquity. The “classical” authors
of modern philology, from Friedrich Schlegel to Derrida, have founded
their work on reconsidering textual details, which resist stabilization – just
think of Derrida’s scrupulous rereading of formerly neglected details in
Rousseau. In this sense, one can – as I shall in this article – reserve the
term “philology” for the operation of reconsidering the so-called “mate-
rial” or object-like basis of text for interpretation.8 The central accom-
plishment of philology is the mediation of interpretation and the
“objective” givens of actual texts – and thereby the constitution of literary
scholarship’s precarious disciplinary unity.9
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This paper’s aim is to establish thoroughly the relation of these philo-
logical mediations to the culture concept. I propose to relate the diﬀer-
ence between textual criticism and interpretation to the more abstract
diﬀerence between text and communication. The traditional dichotomy
has made us think of texts as stable objects and of communication, in
contrast, as an ephemeral process; and we usually hold that the philolog-
ical constitution of text focuses on texts as objects (even if it is attentive
to textual variance), whilst interpretation opens them to communicative
processes. Challenges to this notion, which might help us get closer to
philology’s power of mediation, put emphasis on the paradoxical status
of text between stableness and variance. They can be found, on the one
hand, in both the hermeneutic tradition (Gadamer 1984, 54) and
post-structuralism (as for example in Barthes’s concept of “writable
text”; cf. Dembeck 2007a). On the other hand, recent systems’ theoreti-
cal approaches to communication, transgressing Luhmann’s original the-
ory, highlight communication’s dependence on proto-textual structures,
and thus open it to genuinely philological approaches. This paper fol-
lows the second approach, for systems theory enables us to describe tex-
tual variance and its signiﬁcance to the culture concept more precisely
than hermeneutics and post-structuralism. Contrary to these movements,
it provides insight into the structural diﬀerence between text and commu-
nication, and only thereby lets us see how they are, at the same time,
structurally entangled.
Luhmann’s original sociological theory describes communication as a
recursive process – and not as the “transport” of messages from “sen-
der” to “receiver.”10 He starts out from the observation that the mean-
ing (Sinn) of all our utterances in communication is never shaped by our
own will and intentions, but only by the responses they provoke.11 Even
those who “receive” a message will not be able to decide what it eventu-
ally will have said because their responses will be subject to the same
problem – which is why, actually, nobody can ever “receive” and get
hold of any message. It is not my partners in communication who deter-
mine what I say, but their responses and the responses to their
responses, and so forth. The single communicative event is “displaced”
in time: It comes into being only after it has occurred – a consequence
that puts Luhmann’s theory close to Derrida and his notion of diﬀe´rance
(cf. Luhmann 2001a). Only the very process of responding, which cannot
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be eﬀectively controlled by any form of consciousness, determines the
communicative status of any utterance whatsoever. Therefore, the com-
municative process must be considered self-determined – it cannot be
controlled by human intentions and is thus decoupled from conscious-
ness. This does not mean that communication proceeds in a completely
“chaotic” or “anarchic” manner. It gains stability and continuance by
the simple fact that it establishes a recursive interrelation between com-
municative events: Any utterance enhances its chances to be accepted,
repeatedly employed and further developed by future utterances if in
turn it relates back to formerly “successful” utterances. Vice versa, evo-
lutionary change is brought into place if new, or at least unusual, utter-
ances prove to be successful despite this fact. Communication, according
to Luhmann, is thus the self-governed process of transforming messages
which cannot be controlled by any “sender” or “receiver” and achieves
its stability as well as its openness (cf. Bunia 2012) for further evolution
by ways of recursion – even though it remains to be explained how
exactly these recursions come into being.
Obviously, Luhmann’s concept of communication thoroughly aﬀects
the relation between text and interpretation – interpretation is always a
communicative act. But unlike the more than ephemeral events of com-
munication, texts are in fact (also) stable; they consist of perceivably per-
sisting structures. When communication uses texts as its medium it is
seemingly deprived of its event character, as Luhmann himself puts it
(Luhmann 1986, 631). At the same time texts, if they are used in com-
munication, become subject to communication’s temporal restraints.
They can only momentarily become part of communicational processes.
Just like any other utterance, they need to ﬁnd a response, a response to
the response, and so forth, if they are to achieve communicative signiﬁ-
cance. Luhmann himself has not developed his concept of textual com-
munication any further. This has been done by both Stanitzek and
Baßler, who argue from a philological point of view (although not
inspired by “new” philology). They have demonstrated that Luhmann
overlooks the general signiﬁcance of textual communication for his the-
ory (Stanitzek 1996, 23–28; Baßler 2005, 117–126). Since texts, unlike
oral utterances, continue to exist after they have been “received,” since
they are, in this sense, “objects,” they can be reread. But writing is not
the only medium that provides communication with object-like qualities.
Reading Ornament 371
In fact, the moment in which an utterance occurs is never identical with
the moment in which a response might occur. Something must still be
there that can be reconsidered for communicative recursions to take
place, whether it be a text or the individual memories of human beings
(Stanitzek 1996, 28–35). Any communication thus implies the persistence
of something that supports or carries it. In other words, any communi-
cation implies something of a textual dimension – a claim that, again,
evidently echoes deconstructionist positions. Textuality and communica-
tive recursion are thus nothing but two entangled structural aspects of
communication: Recursions cannot occur without a textual basis, and
textual structures do not “exist” in the full sense of the word as long as
there is no communicative event that relates to them. Of course, the
paper and ink of a text in their physical existence do not depend on
communication – but no text can be reduced to “its” paper and ink.
Rather, textuality engages both communicational recursion and its sup-
port in some kind of object.
It remains to be questioned how exactly communication in its complex
temporal structure refers to its underlying textual structure and how a
text can integrate into communicative processes. This question is pivotal
to literary scholarship not only because it aﬀects our concepts of textual
criticism, reading and interpretation, but also because a textual (or: phil-
ological) description of communication leads us to the culture concept: I
suggest that the modern concept of culture acts in response to the prob-
lems that occur when one aims to get hold of the complex interrelation
between textuality and communication – and thus the miracle of recur-
sive openness and stability. A philology that is self-aware of these prob-
lems can provide us with alternative ways of reading culture and make a
considerable contribution to the “cultivation” of society.
II. Figure and ornament: Constituting the letter
Communication is always accompanied by a structure of textuality. Our
interactions may at times seem to be rather ephemeral and to lack any
kind of reliable stableness. But we would not be able to continue com-
munication if it were not for the complex remaining “texture” of interre-
lated former utterances of ourselves and others. This “texture” seems to
guarantee a certain stability in communicational meaning (Sinn). This
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observation has consequences for the concepts of text and communica-
tion. A closer examination of the elements that all texts seem to be made
of, namely letters, will help describe the complex relation between textual
and communicational structures more accurately (for a diﬀerent pro-
posal see Baßler 2005, 131–139).
Literary scholarship routinely leaves to specialists of textual criticism
the problem that the same letters exist in very diﬀerent shapes. It usually
bases its work on texts that have already been constituted in scholarly
editions. Scholarly editors therefore seem to be the only ones profession-
ally concerned with the problem of deciphering, and the developments
of the last 40 years, culminating in the discussion on new philology,
show that they take their task ever more seriously, thus making us
increasingly aware of the highly complex transformations involved in
constituting a text. This scrupulous attitude is up to this date not always
appreciated. But the fact that we need editors to constitute the letters we
refer to shows that we should not take them for granted. Following
Luhmann’s operational description of communication, I shall analyze
what we do when we recognize an object as a letter, that is to say, how
we give an object literal meaning and thus constitute it as a letter. This
analysis will enable us to demonstrate how reading, also on the level of
interpretation, structurally resembles the act of deciphering.
The letter as the elementary textual unit is mainly characterized by its
mere iterability; it can be copied without loss. We can discern the letter
A as identical, even though it may appear in very diﬀerent shapes – with
serifs or without serifs, in Courier or in Times, in handwriting or in
print. Of course we usually perceive these diﬀerences, but we can be sure
that an A remains an A even if it is transformed into another typeface
(cf. McGann 2006, 160–162). On a more abstract level one could say
that any time we use characters we diﬀerentiate between the character’s
abstract ﬁgure (in the sense of Gestalt, not in the rhetorical sense of the
word), the shape that makes it distinguishable, and other, purely orna-
mental features that are attached to it, but that can be ignored as long
as one is focusing on the encoded meaning of the text. The form of the
letter is thus the diﬀerence between its ﬁgure and its ornamental parer-
gon.12 This diﬀerence is used before the potential meanings of any text
can be focused and even before the diﬀerence between signiﬁer and signi-
ﬁed can be employed: There would not even be a letter if we could not
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determine its ﬁgure as it appears within the potential abundance of its
ornamental features. However, we can never precisely say what parts of
the image that we see are necessary for a characteristic ﬁgure to be visi-
ble (Hofstadter 1982): We can recognize an A that lacks seemingly essen-
tial features, but we can also recognize an A that is buried under a
heavy armor of ornamental parerga. In other words, the diﬀerentiation
between ﬁgure and ornament that we easily and repeatedly execute can-
not be reduced to a ﬁxed algorithm. It is, however stable, in its core con-
tingent because we cannot foresee with necessity what in future we shall
recognize to be or not to be an A, or rather, how in future the ﬁgure of
A might spring out from ornaments we have not even thought of yet.13
In order to see why the diﬀerence between ﬁgure and ornament is cen-
tral for the description of textuality and communication, it is useful to
compare it to other diﬀerences that might come to mind: In describing
ﬁgure and ornament as the constitutive parts of the letter, one certainly
concentrates on signiﬁers. Eventually, however, this description trans-
gresses the Saussurean diﬀerence between signiﬁer and signiﬁed. One
might assume that once one has established the ﬁgure of a signiﬁer, as
diﬀering from its ornamental “parergon,” one has entered the realm of
the signiﬁed. However, in what the signiﬁer seems to signify, one will
have to look for what is actually signiﬁcant and thus diﬀerentiate once
more between signiﬁcant ﬁgures and the ornaments attached to them,
and so forth. The diﬀerence between ﬁgure and ornament must also not
be confused with the diﬀerence between type and token. According to
Peirce, types and tokens are mutually dependent, since a type has to be
embodied within tokens, and tokens are in turn “determine[d]” by
“their” type. As a third term, Peirce introduces “Tone,” an “indeﬁnite
signiﬁcant character such as a tone of a voice” (Peirce 1933, 537). Even
though the concept of “tone” has been largely ignored in further theoret-
ical developments, it could have helped to uncover a decisive problem.
Whereas the philosophical discussion usually concentrates on the prob-
lem of how a type exerts its determining power over “its” tokens, the
concept of tone raises the question of how tokens can gain recognizabil-
ity ﬁrst of all – how can they be more then just tone? My concept of
ﬁgure and ornament starts out from this problem. The diﬀerence
between ﬁgure and ornament is furthermore linked to the diﬀerence
between “ﬁgure and ground” as developed by Gestalt psychology and
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phenomenology,14 because the diﬀerence between ﬁgure and ornament
can only be constituted against a “ground” already neglected. The diﬀer-
ence between ﬁgure and ornament is the eﬀect of a re-entry (see Luh-
mann 1993) of the diﬀerence between ﬁgure and ground on the side of
the ﬁgure: Within phenomena that seem to be distinctly deﬁned, such as
a ﬁgure on a ground, one must always diﬀerentiate once more between
signiﬁcant and recognizable details (ﬁgures in the sense that I have given
the word) and pure ornament. This makes the distinction between ﬁgure
and ornament much more unstable – and open for evolutionary change.
The concept most closely related to the diﬀerence of ﬁgure and orna-
ment is the diﬀerence between digital and analog (Wilden 1980, 169–
170). If digital code is deﬁned by the fact that it can be copied without a
loss, then one might say that in the ﬁgure we grasp the letter as part of
a digital code whereas the ornament is left in an analog state. The diﬀer-
ence between ﬁgure and ornament is thus important for a theoretically
advanced description of textuality and communication, because it makes
us understand how digital text may dynamically emerge from objects
such as printed paper, computer screens, and so forth.15
As Lotman has shown – although in a diﬀerent terminology and within
a diﬀerent theoretical setting – the diﬀerence between digital ﬁgure and
ornamental parergon does not only occur on the level on which letters
are deﬁned. Reading is bound to it on every linguistic level. It always has
to determine what it treats as signiﬁcant and what it excludes from its
observations, leaving it in its purely ornamental state. A syntactical anal-
ysis of a text will not consider its paragraph structure; the reconstruction
of a storyline will ignore the respective text’s paratextual shape; and the
metric qualities of a sonnet may be observed while neglecting its many
assonances. Of course, one is always free to include in one’s conﬁguration
of the text what otherwise might have been excluded (cf. Lotman 1993,
92–121). But as Hirsch has shown in the framework of his objective her-
meneutics, the pure necessity of putting emphases on something in order
to come to an understanding always bears the potential of producing
irreconcilable contradictions in the text (see his critical account of “inclu-
sivism” in Hirsch 1967, 227–230). Hirsch’s goal is to provide a strategy to
decide which emphasis can objectively be justiﬁed and which readings
thus correspond to the true “meaning” (Sinn in the sense of Frege, as
Hirsch claims) of a text – as distinguished from its mere “signiﬁcance”
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(Bedeutung), its more or less contingent further connotations. But Lot-
man, although ignorant of Hirsch’s approach, makes it very clear that
such a reading, on any level, would fail to grasp the text in its object-like
quality. Its selections always remain contingent, however stable they are.
Therefore, the text as a whole, as an object-like substrate of reading,
remains impenetrable (Lotman 1993, 121). We always try to ﬁnd, in
Mukarovsky’s terms, an “intentional” arrangement in the text. But the
text’s existence as an object guarantees that it will also incorporate “unin-
tentional,” contingent facets that yet need to be included – thus once
more enforcing the search for intentionality (Mukarovsky 1977, 36, 45,
59, 64–65). It is thus precisely the existence of the text as an object that
at one and the same time promises and up to a certain degree also guar-
antees the stability of textual meaning and forces us to decide contin-
gently how to emphasize the text in order to get hold of it. Due to its
object-like qualities, any text is always both stable and open to alterna-
tive ﬁgurations of its meaning (Lotman 1993, 83–84).
Both Lotman and Mukarovsky restrict most of their argument to lit-
erary texts, or at least to art. But it is easy to broaden their perspective
and relate Lotman’s cybernetic theory of the literary text to the more
general claim that a moment of textuality inheres in any communication.
Lotman begins with the classical distinction between signal and noise, as
formulated by Shannon and Weaver in their mathematical theory of
communication. Although this theory, at least in its ﬁrst outlines,
describes communication as transport and thus substantially diﬀers from
my presuppositions, I would like to claim – thereby closing the list of
relatives – that the diﬀerence between signal and noise is linked to the
diﬀerence between ﬁgure and ornament. Shannon and Weaver show that
signal and noise are equivalent insofar as noise only adds information to
the information the signal conveys. Just as any meaningful ﬁgure must
be distilled from the ornamental abundance of information within which
it appears, the signal or “desirable uncertainty” (that is: information)
inhibiting a message must be diﬀerentiated from its “undesirable uncer-
tainty,” its noise (Shannon & Weaver 1978, 18–22). Both noise and the
ornamental dimension of characters and texts thus refer to the undiﬀer-
entiated and indistinct dimension of communicative substrates, to the
haze that must be present in order to contrast ﬁgurative meaning. But
Shannon and Weaver describe communication as a process and therefore
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deﬁne signal and noise only in their processual nature. My concept of
“ornament” also takes into account that these processes rely on proto-
textual structures: Any “receptive” operation – of a text, of an oral utter-
ance, of a television broadcast – is bound to make some diﬀerence
between ﬁgure and ornament and thereby creates an object-like, textual
residuum that accompanies the communicative process and provides it
with the potential for dynamic “rereadings.”
Philologists obviously care for this object-like dimension of communi-
cation; they want it to become present to communication.16 Certainly,
the assumed dignity of speciﬁc texts has enhanced the development of this
scrupulous skepticism in the past and renders the methods derived from
it valuable also for today’s scholars.17 One might even claim that philol-
ogy is somewhat constituted by the bias between its aim for “scientiﬁc”
neutrality towards its objects and the justiﬁcation of its scrupulous
approach in their esthetic (or other) appreciation.18 However, the insight
that one might never and at no linguistic level know in advance which of
the seemingly purely ornamental features of a text will in future be
included and for its never-ending editorial eﬀorts. “New” philology may
thus be described as the attempt to widen radically the focus of what
might be the ﬁgural basis of the interpretation of medieval text. Its aim,
to provide more ornament in order to ﬁnd out if there are more ﬁgures in
it, is based on arguments about the speciﬁc medial situation of the middle
ages in contrast with the present. The general theory of textuality and
communication as developed in this article gives new philology’s aim a
broader basis: It is the contingence of any diﬀerence between ﬁgure and
ornament that justiﬁes the skeptical and never-ending philological eﬀort
of new philology and its relatives in the editorial practice of modern liter-
ary texts. Only by relating to and cultivating the “material” basis of text
is one able to establish stability of meaning, but precisely this recursion
to the “material” basis once more opens it up to further questioning.
III. Reading culture
Despite the prevailing division of labor between the constitution and the
interpretation of text, literary scholarship has inherited much of philol-
ogy’s skepticism. It has in fact never totally delegated the care of the
letter to scholarly edition alone, and there have always been philologists
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in the sense I have given the word – scholars who use the reconsidera-
tion of the object-like basis of text as a starting point for its interpreta-
tion. It is therefore interesting to see in which areas a philological
approach has had an especially strong impact in recent years. For it
seems that philological attention to the irritating power of texts as
objects has been particularly vivid in studies concerned with culture.
Movements like New Historicism, but also cultural studies in general,
found their way into the archives and turned their attention to an alter-
native dimension of textual objects long ago. To read diﬀerent texts and
to read them diﬀerently, reversing established patterns of emphasis, has
been characteristic for studies in postcolonialism, popular culture, and
gender alike. This shift of attention can be considered philologically
motivated, as it implies alternative ways to diﬀerentiate meaningful ﬁgu-
rations. But only if these readings incorporate the textual, quasi-objec-
tive support itself do they become philological in the strict sense of the
word. Many recent studies, often combining an interest in culture with
an interest in media, have done exactly this: Film studies, for example,
have taught us that for a long time the choice of ﬁlming material latently
followed racist presuppositions – by allowing only light skin colors to be
represented in high quality (Dyer 1997, 82–144). Art history, for exam-
ple, has turned our attention to the carnivalesque marginal drawings of
late medieval manuscripts and thereby made us aware of social mecha-
nisms at once subversive to and aﬃrmative of the suppressive morals of
traditional culture as expressed in the seemingly main text of the manu-
scripts (Camille 1992). And literary scholarship itself has shown how
manifold (and often very “material”) mediations of (textual) critics could
subject a protean corpus of writing such as Emily Dickinson’s papers to
the ideology of (lyrical) subjectivity (Jackson 2005). In philological read-
ings like these, seemingly ornamental (or “technical”) details gain ﬁgural
meaning and trigger new understandings of (historical) culture.
What makes philological techniques applicable to culture is the fact
that culture must be deﬁned with regard to the textual support of com-
munication. Consider, for example, the way we observe cultural diﬀer-
ence: As Baecker points out, the term “culture” was coined in the
eighteenth century as the consequence of a new practice of comparison
(Baecker 2001b, 46–50; cf. Luhmann 1995, Nassehi 2003). One started to
confront social practices and phenomena with diﬀerent and deviating
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practices and phenomena – thus highlighting their contingency. Undeni-
able truths could thus be declared to be historically, socially, or region-
ally – in a word: “culturally” – speciﬁc. Since then, as I would like to add
to Baecker’s description, cultural comparison has been concerned with
how diﬀerently ﬁgurations may be considered as meaningful in communi-
cation – be it by diﬀerent peoples, classes, institution, and so on.
Think, for example, of table manners, a classical ﬁeld of cultural com-
parison. Evidently, communication at table does not only consist of toasts
and the general conversation, but includes many other, seemingly “orna-
mental” aspects. To observe or not to observe certain rules of behavior,
for example, may be a statement or testify cultural diﬀerence. Indepen-
dently from our theory of communication and textuality, it has been dem-
onstrated that our making sense of a person’s behavior, just as any other
communication, involves quasi-textual structures: Some social scientists
would call the set of rules that one follows at the table a script,19 and
Geertz has shown – in elaborating on Ryle’s famous description of a wink-
ing boy – that any interpretation of a behavioral detail must relate to a
“texture” of yet established meanings (Geertz 1973, 5–10). It will soon
become obvious that Geertz has gone too far in identifying the “webs of
signiﬁcance” (p. 5), within which human behavior is entangled, with cul-
ture. But he is right in claiming that the cultural description of a ﬁeld such
as table manners will have to integrate a concept of textuality. Anyone’s
actual performance at the table incorporates a vast number of details. For
any of these details to become communicatively relevant or even distin-
guishable, it needs to be related to “records” of other communicative
events that exist in the individual memories of the persons present – and
may have been internalized in family traditions, codiﬁed in manuals, or
taught in etiquette and manners courses. To cut or not to cut potatoes, to
handle knife and fork European- or American-style, to clink or not to
clink glasses – all this can become part of the communication taking place
at the table if it becomes related to this “texture” or “script” – to the
textual support of communication. It than takes on ﬁgural meaning and
does not remain in its “original” purely ornamental state.
Table manners are subject to cultural comparison simply because the
diﬀerence between their ﬁgural and ornamental features can be made in
very diﬀerent ways. Both within the actual performance of the particular
eater and within the textual support it is related to, one has to
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distinguish which details are part of some script’s ﬁgural dimension and
which are ornamental. I may or may not continue to observe the rule
not to cut potatoes by knife, even though hardly any blade is still made
of silver, which would run the danger of oxidizing when in touch with
the potato (cf. Stanitzek 1996, 32–33). If I continue to observe it, this
may go by unnoticed, or it may lead to my being judged to be either
speciﬁcally cultivated or particularly pedantic. Whether there is a judg-
ment at all depends on whether my action is related to some textual sup-
port, for example, in the individual memories of the participants, and
both judgments will be constituted with regard to this support – which,
at the same time, they would be capable of changing. Cultural compari-
son always proceeds considering some textual support of communica-
tion, and culture is thus closely tied to communication’s textual
dimension.
How can this “tie” be described more thoroughly? I have already sta-
ted that I do not follow Geertz’s equation of culture with the semantic
texture a society uses to make sense of people’s behavior. This equation
is not precise because the process of cultivating or changing this texture
is evidently also part of culture. The theory of communication and textu-
ality as proposed in this paper provides a more precise approach in that
it highlights the contrast between communication and textuality as well
as their interrelation: The self-determined process of communication,
consisting of nothing but a chain of seemingly ephemeral events,
depends on a form of textuality it can never fully access. To the decou-
pling of communication from consciousness thus corresponds a “decou-
pling” of communication from textuality. Neither are the ﬁgures
communication uses and the ornaments it neglects determinable from
the “material” features of its textual basis only (as, for example, the dis-
tribution of black and white dots on a computer screen), nor can any
feature of textuality strictly enforce any speciﬁc communicative ﬁgura-
tion. Still, the structural link between the two obviously also grants a
surprising stability of the textual ﬁgures in communicational use.
Descriptions of the many mechanisms that allow for this slightly para-
doxical interrelation between communication and its textual substrate
are far from being well established – and maybe one should not even
hope to ﬁnd a thorough description of them. However, Western thought
has at least found a designation for them: culture.
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One may reasonably ask, if the rather dispersed meanings of the term
actually sum up to a concept.20 The explanation for our uneasiness with
giving it one proper meaning is that it was coined to cover a complex
and inherently paradoxical structure. The interrelation between commu-
nication and its textual basis must be put into at least two contradictory
and still inseparable perspectives which correspond to the two most com-
mon approaches to culture: the concept of culture as a set of norms and
rules that somehow govern communication; and the concept of culture
as a pool (or archive) of alternatives to the manifest structures of soci-
ety.21 The ﬁrst approach aims at explaining the stability of social pro-
cesses and relations. Typically, its descriptions of culture take the form
of a list naming all the factors, which seem to determine individual
instances of social behavior. Tylor provided the most prominent descrip-
tion of this kind in 1871 (Tylor 1958, 1). The individuals thus subjected
to the norms of culture at the same time embody them, and these norms
would not come into being without becoming embodied by individuals.
Therefore, theories of this kind tend to build upon an anthropological
(or at least psychological) foundation (see, prominently, Malinowski
2002, 36–37). The same holds for many traditional theories of Kulturkri-
tik from Rousseau over Freud to Horkheimer and Adorno which see
individual needs and cultural norms entangled in an unceasing conﬂict –
thereby aiming at liberating the subject in the name of an alternative,
higher form of culture. At this point, approaches of the ﬁrst kind
become similar to approaches of the second kind, which hold culture to
be a pool of alternatives to existing social structures. According to these
descriptions, societies by ways of culture enclose within themselves alter-
natives to themselves – an argument that ﬁnds its basis in Bateson’s con-
cept of “schismogenesis” (Bateson 1935). Some representatives of a
semiotics of culture have carried this point further, as for example Lot-
man, who argues that a necessary function of culture is the “production
of indetermination” (Lotman 1974, 418: “Erzeugung von Unbestimmt-
heit”; cf. the concept of “semiosphere” in Lotman 2010, 163–202). Cul-
ture thus appears to be an archive that is open to new readings rather
than a program governing social processes. It is not surprising that many
current descriptions of culture (and partly also Geertz’s older concept of
culture as an “acted document”; Geertz 1973, 10), try to reconcile both
approaches. Such a reconciliation, however, can never be thoroughly
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developed because the two aspects of culture are at the same time mutu-
ally exclusive and mutually dependent. The stability culture provides
comes at the price of being based upon contingent operations, whereas
the evolutionary openness of culture in the long run also contributes to
communicative stability – an argument that has at least partly been
made by Lotman, even though he still lacks the theoretical means to pre-
cisely diﬀerentiate between text and communication. This diﬀerentiation,
however, is the key to a thorough understanding of culture’s twofold
appearance.
On the one hand, culture guarantees stability. It provides communica-
tion with ways to diﬀerentiate between meaningful ﬁgures and excluded
ornaments – not only on the level of constituting letters or sounds, but
also on all other levels of communication. Since communication depends
on this service, culture appears as the mechanism that deﬁnes the norms
and rules of a society. There may be societies in which the way of wrap-
ping up a present is highly codiﬁed and loaded with ﬁgural signiﬁcance,
although someone foreign to this set of rules may consider the wrapping
as a purely ornamental detail. Or there may be situations where one has
to pay special attention to the speciﬁc medium used to transmit a mes-
sage. There still is a diﬀerence between a hand- or a typewritten love let-
ter, although the preference for handwriting (or even for the love letter
as such) is deﬁnitely declining. In this perspective, culture is considered
the characteristic basis of diﬀerent societies or epochs, something that
seemingly grants them identity. As long as communication does not
make use of its (rather new) potential for cultural comparison, the spe-
ciﬁc meaningful ﬁgures oﬀered by the “own” culture seem to be the
unquestionable foundation of social life. From the viewpoint of a socio-
logical theory of communication, all these rules come about as conse-
quences of communicative self-organization. This process might also
have had a very diﬀerent outcome, since any diﬀerentiation between ﬁg-
ural and ornamental features of communication’s textual support is, at
its basis, contingent. But the fact that communicative recursion always
has a stabilizing eﬀect, also stabilizes the rules that govern these diﬀeren-
tiations. Although built upon contingent operations, culture as the bun-
dle of mechanisms linking communication to its textual basis thus
indeed enhances the development of rule-driven processes. Without this
accomplishment, there would be no communicative stability at all.
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On the other hand, culture also always confronts communication with
alternative diﬀerentiations between ﬁgures and the ornaments inherent
to its textual basis. As Baecker writes, though arguing from a diﬀerent
perspective, culture is “an accompanying observation” (Baecker 2001b,
9: “eine mitlaufende Beobachtung”) through which a potential to conﬁg-
ure the world diﬀerently becomes part of any communication. After all,
the continuation of communication depends on contingent selections
from somewhat stable material, which, like any text, is always open to
alternative readings. There is, however, never a means to make sure that
the ﬁgures selected by communication remain identical. Since communi-
cation’s textual basis is in a certain way independent from communica-
tion, it may appear to be its “archive” – the last resort for ornamental
features of former communication that have never been used. One rea-
son for the abundance of this archive certainly is the fact that communi-
cation’s textual basis is extremely dispersed: It is contained in billions of
individuals, texts, records, and electronic traces. Communication’s self-
determined selections give only some of the potential ﬁgurations inherent
in this dispersion a chance. However, the abundance of cultural alterna-
tives is functional in that it ensures society’s capability to adapt to new
situations by relating to so far unemployed or yet unthought of ﬁgura-
tions of meaning in order to develop new norms. Culture thus also pro-
vides us with the capacity to break with seemingly necessary rules and to
render them contingent once more – with the paradoxical eﬀect that in
most cases this will yet again lead to rather stable new rules.
Both perspectives on culture cannot be separated; they are, as I have
said, mutually dependent: Culture incorporates mechanisms, which – on
the basis of communicative recursion – provide contingent, but stable
rules on how to diﬀerentiate ﬁgures from ornaments. This very opera-
tion, however, depends on a diverse and divergent textual basis that
always also allows for diﬀerent diﬀerentiations. The mere possibility of
making use of these alternatives renders culture a medium of evolution-
ary change. By interrelating the communicative process with its diverse
and ever changing textual basis, culture provides for both stability and
evolutionary openness. As a consequence, what we call “cultural identi-
ties” are only the eﬀects of contingent diﬀerentiations – they mark, in
fact, diﬀerences between diﬀerent ways to diﬀerentiate between ﬁgures
and ornaments. Culture tends to stabilize these identities, but its
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openness for evolution at the same time always makes them subject to
potential further diﬀerentiation or deformation.22
To deﬁne culture as the mere name for the loose bundle of mecha-
nisms that provide links between the communicative process and its
textual residuum does not only explain cultural theory’s schism into
norm- and archive-centered approaches. It also helps to account more
precisely for various other ways in which we employ the term. It might,
for example, seem surprising that modern societies of the West, in the
name of culture, attach such great signiﬁcance to objects.23 This attach-
ment may be easily explained in the case of objects that have come to
bear quasi-religious meaning, such as the Liberty Bell, but not necessar-
ily when one considers expensive programs to restore otherwise insigniﬁ-
cant buildings from whatever historical period. The foundation of such
eﬀorts evidently lies in the belief that these objects somehow bear a con-
siderable amount of irreplaceable “original” traces of potentially insur-
mountable richness of meaning. Even though this belief may very easily
be deconstructed, the fact that we hold objects to be culturally valuable
is eventually and rightly founded in the insight that the objects of com-
munication will always bear a (as yet ornamental) surplus of signiﬁcance
yet to be conﬁgured. This feature makes objects ideal symbols of other-
wise questionable so-called “cultural identities.” They give those who
perceive their cultural identity expressed by, or contained in, such an
object the opportunity to distinguish themselves from those who cannot
“read” this speciﬁc object’s speciﬁc meaning. But also the persistent con-
cept of a universal culture of humanity, which the “real” cultures ever
fail to comprehend fully, can be explained in the framework of a philo-
logical theory of culture. As culture is irreducible to any deﬁned set and
thus always bears alternative possibilities to conﬁgure ornament, it is
always possible to devaluate concrete cultural phenomena as just partic-
ular – thus negatively pointing to a “universal” level of a culture, even
when leaving it to speculation how it could ever be grasped.24
Finally, the concept of culture presented here enables us to understand
why we can, convincingly, both hold everything in society to be culturally
determined, and, in our everyday usage, reserve the term “culture” to spe-
ciﬁc areas of communication. In principle, as we have seen, the functioning
of cultural mechanisms is a necessary precondition for communicative
recursion. However, these mechanisms, in diﬀerent communicative
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contexts, are more or less strictly conditioned and thus allow for more or
less variance. Therefore, we quite rightly hold diﬀerent areas of communi-
cation to be culturally determined in very diﬀerent degrees: Art, for exam-
ple, derives its fascination from the fact that it specializes in making
ornaments take on ﬁgural meaning and dissolving seemingly stable ﬁgures
into mere ornaments.25 Ambiguous patterns, plays on the attention of the
recipient, reverses of traditional ways of making sense of the world – all
these maneuvers can be found in abundance in (at least modern) literature,
visual arts, and music, and all of them make use of the utter contingency
of our ways of “reading culture.” It is thus not accidental that Lotman’s
and Mukarovsky’s accounts of the ornamental abundance of text start out
from an analysis of the literary text and the work of art as a “material”
object. And the diﬀerence between ﬁgure and ornament itself has not acci-
dentally ﬁrst been developed in a description of art. Other areas of our
social life we hold to be non-cultural or at least only very weakly inﬂu-
enced by cultural factors. In these areas, communicative conditioning is at
times so strong as not to allow for ornamental deviations. It has been
argued that mathematics may be described as a form of communication
capable of refraining from any contingent diﬀerentiation between ﬁgure
and ornament (Bunia 2008, 213). Many sciences try to operate so as to
exclude the possibility of alternative ﬁguration of its textual basis as far as
possible. Also in the ﬁeld of economy, cultural contingence is favorably
neglected – but must at times be called into memory, for example by send-
ing managers to seminars on “intercultural communication” to make them
appear more “cultivated” in situations foreign to them. Culture in the uni-
versal sense of “cultivatedness” (cf. Hamacher 1997) is thus nothing but
the ability, formerly claimed by the aristocracy, always to know the rules –
but also to realize when it is necessary to deviate from them. A “culti-
vated” person is characterized by his or her ability to adapt his or her
mode of diﬀerentiating ﬁgural meaning to new situations.
IV. Philology and culture
The claim that culture is the name for all mechanisms interrelating com-
munication with its textual basis certainly provides an explanation for
literary scholarships and other text-based disciplines’ preoccupation with
it. What beneﬁt, however, might literary scholarship gain from this
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insight? And what may be the speciﬁc service that a professionalized phi-
lology oﬀers to society?
First, the thorough development of the theory of communication, text,
and culture as proposed in this article helps the discipline to achieve new
forms of modesty and self-consciousness at the same time. The insight
into the fact that every reading depends on diﬀerentiations between some
ﬁgure and some ornament that are as much contingent as they are rule-
driven will trigger a more precise way of developing other ﬁelds of liter-
ary theory. Being notoriously blamed for its lack of precision, literary
scholarship would beneﬁt from the confession that on the one hand its
own operations in principle do not diﬀer from those of any other kind
of reading. For this confession on the other hand provides the opportu-
nity to develop a more thorough account of how philological reading,
because of to its respect for the material substrate of text, has developed
highly reliable and stable methods. We should learn to accept that the
disciplinary unity of literary scholarship is self-contradictory: In each of
its operations it relates to structures it treats as stable, at the same time
counting on the fact that, on every level, these structures are actually –
not only in the sense of the concept of variance – also highly variable. In
this self-contradiction, one can once more trace the diﬀerence between
constituting and interpreting text – and between culture as a set of rules
and culture as an archive of alternative ﬁgurations. However, it now
becomes obvious that both textual criticism and interpretation are them-
selves subject to the ambivalence thus characterized: Textual criticism
constitutes stable texts, at the same time casting doubt on their ﬁxed sta-
tus, whereas interpretation relates to stable texts, at the same time ren-
dering them dynamic by its reading. Literary scholarship can gain its
speciﬁc form of precision only by ways of a continuous reﬂection upon
this ambivalence: Rather than through the ever more detailed account of
textual ornament, which is nevertheless necessary, it is through cultivat-
ing disciplinary self-reﬂexivity (including “theory”26) and through gain-
ing a clear perspective on the status and scope of its results that literary
scholarship can compete with the so-called “hard” sciences.
Second, we will have to maintain the basic philological operations if
we want to accommodate the complex structure of culture in its stability
as well as its openness to evolutionary change. The above-mentioned
recent tendency of literary scholarship and cultural studies to focus
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medial and “material” contexts of communication implicitly follows a
philological ethic. But still, the division of labor between textual criticism
and interpretation prevails, and it is deepened by a tendency to neglect
the formal and linguistic qualities of text – the study of meter and lexical
peculiarities is not commonly the focus of culturally-interested
approaches. A philological engagement with culture must care for these
dimensions of text without falling into aestheticist ideology or formalist
positivism. It must pay close attention to the contingent operations,
which constitute textuality and develop a thoroughly operational per-
spective on the interrelation of text and communication – repeatedly sus-
pending the act of interpretation and falling back into the pedantry of a
philological access to the texts and wondering about seemingly ornamen-
tal details. It is an important insight that cultural studies, in order to be
successful, need philology’s attention to what is ﬁxed in texts – just as
the philological care for literature and other texts needs culture as the
mechanism that dynamically supplies it with ornaments to read. This
mutual dependence once more reﬂects culture’s paradoxical status as
both a guarantee of rule-driven stableness and a stimulator of archival
variance.
Third, the preoccupation with ornaments turned into ﬁgures (and vice
versa) links both philology and cultural studies to art and literature. It is
characteristic of artworks and literary texts – no matter how canonical
they are – that they challenge the reader to ﬁnd ﬁgural meaning in their
seemingly ornamental dimensions. Works of art, at least since the emer-
gence of “autonomous art,” exploit the contingency of any diﬀerentia-
tion between ﬁgure and ornament and prefer it to the stabilizing eﬀects
of communicative recurrence. The mechanism of turning ornament into
ﬁgure and vice versa is precisely what gives art its (precarious) stability.
The sequence of modernity’s avant-gardes up to the playfulness of so
called postmodernism re-enacts this mechanism over and over again.
This makes (literary) works of art a particularly promising object of
study both for anyone interested in the development of culture and for
anyone devoted to the philological constitution and interpretation of
text.
This last observation, however, also gives way to a question that might
seem a threat to philologically-based academic disciplines: If art is akin to
these disciplines, and if art already specializes in the transformation of
Reading Ornament 387
ornaments into ﬁgures, thus enhancing cultural evolution, why then do we
also need academic disciplines devoted to more or less the same task? At
ﬁrst sight, the theory of communication, textuality, and culture, as pro-
posed in this paper, may indeed lead to the conclusion that philology is
nothing but a discipline of art. But art and philology diﬀer in the way
they stabilize their own evolution. Art explicitly prefers the exposition of
contingency to the development of stability. It can only go on if it ﬁnds
new and surprising ways to irritate established diﬀerentiations between
ﬁgures and ornaments – although, of course, it could not do without sta-
bilizing recurrences, either. Philology, since it is not only related to art,
but also to scholarship, explicitly aims at establishing stable descriptions
of contingent developments in the relation between communication and
textuality – although, of course, it is bound to the insight that its
descriptions are themselves only stable thanks to communicative recur-
sions. Philology’s preference for stable descriptions may explain its pref-
erence for historical objects (Stanitzek 2000) – as art’s preference for
contingent changes enhances an explicitly selective way of dealing with
the past. In its quest for stable descriptions, philology has developed an
elaborate system of conditions to render them valid: editorial norms, the
framework of literary, social, and cultural history, theories of textuality,
literature, communication, and culture, and ﬁnally the very inﬂuential
traditions of interpreting its favorite texts. Apparently, only the scrupu-
lous and time-consuming collection of material and data allows the sus-
tainable establishment of ﬁgural aspects in the seemingly ornamental
parts of text.
As art constantly triggers culture’s – and its own – openness to evolu-
tionary change, philology observes this process, but in its own operations
prefers stability. If art gives society the ability to observe its structures
and operations in their contingent foundation, philology helps it to con-
solidate these insights once more into stable structures. Philology’s social
and cultural responsibility is not only to direct attention to the mere con-
tingency of cultural and social structures as well as to the ideological
restrictions it nevertheless contains, but also to explain the mechanisms
that maintain these structures. Its eﬀectiveness depends on its methods to
validate its descriptions as more reliable (but therefore also less surpris-
ing) than those of art. If it does so convincingly, it might also more
reliably contribute to keeping cultural memory open to potential new
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readings that ﬁnd ﬁgural qualities in formerly seemingly ornamental
dimensions. In order to meet this demand, we must place the ornamental
side of textuality at the center of our attention, even beyond the single
alphabetical character, and at the same time maintain the scrupulous and
deeply skeptical attitude characteristic of philology’s tradition. A philol-
ogy of culture, as proposed by this paper, is in its essence nothing but the
restless and scrupulous reading of ornament. It is not the least of its
achievements that it gives us the chance to avoid the pitfalls of all the
one-sided concepts of culture – and a means to confront irresponsible
uses or even abuses of the term as cited at the very beginning of this
paper.
NOTES
1. Terminological note: In this article, I prefer the term “literary scholarship” to
both “literary criticism” and “Literaturwissenschaft.” As deﬁned in section I, the
term “philology” takes the German discussion of the concept into account; there-
fore its meaning slightly diﬀers from its common use in English-language scholar-
ship.
2. All translations are the author’s own.
3. The founding father of the modern hermeneutic tradition, Schleiermacher, started
out with the diﬀerence between textual criticism (“Kritik”) and interpretation
(“Hermeneutik”) and held the two to be mutually dependent (Schleiermacher
1995, 69–70).
4. Cerquiglini’s concept radicalizes Zumthor’s notion of medieval literature’s mou-
vance (Zumthor 1972, 507).
5. See Nichols 1990 as well as the other articles in that volume of Speculum. Nicolas
later introduced the term “material” philology (Nichols 1997). The movement
does not have much in common with most of the various calls for a “return to
philology” in recent decades, such as de Man’s polemical argument about his very
own method of close reading (de Man 1986) or Said’s philological defense of
humanism (Said 2004). A genuinely “new philological” call for a return to philol-
ogy can be found in Patterson 1994; for recent initiatives see Gumbrecht 2003,
Hamacher 2009, and Pollock 2009.
6. See also developments in book history, as for example advanced by McKenzie
1986, McGann 1991, and in a rather recent issue of PMLA (see, among others,
Price 2006).
7. The question, how philology can turn its skepticism into a productive tool, has
recently found fresh interest; see Benne 2009, and the essays in Bremer et al. 2010.
8. Cf. Gumbrecht’s and Hamacher’s accounts of philology (Gumbrecht 2003, Ham-
acher 2009). Both follow a much less “technical” approach, but start out from
partly similar presupposition; see especially Hamacher 2009, theses 57, 58, 76.
9. The manifestations of this mediation – and therefore the outline of philology’s
disciplinary unity – are, of course, themselves subject to historical change. For the
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context of my argument, it is suﬃcient to state that the opposition between vari-
ance and stability of text and interpretation is constitutive for all these manifesta-
tions.
10. For an implicit deconstruction of the sender–receiver model, see Lotman 2010,
19–52.
11. “Ob ich meine, was ich sage, weiß ich nicht. Und wenn ich es wu¨ßte, mu¨ßte ich
es fu¨r mich behalten,” Luhmann writes in a famous article (Luhmann 2001b,
132: “Whether I mean what I say I do not know. And if I knew it, I would have
to keep it for myself.”). For a broader prospect of Luhmann’s theory of commu-
nication see Luhmann 1996 and Luhmann 1997.
12. See Dembeck 2007b, 413–423; more precisely Bunia 2008; for the concept of
“parergon” see Kant 1996, 142 [B 43], and Derrida 1978, 44–135.
13. Up to this date, computers have not “learned” to read the way human beings
can. Web services implement a simple test to ban internet bots (programs that
perform automated tasks on the internet) from their services: they show some
distorted letters to users who want to create, for example, an email account,
since only humans can successfully decipher them.
14. For the original idea see Rubin 2001. The concept has been applied to phenome-
nology, most prominently in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Husserl stresses that
any actual perception is made against a “Hof von Hintergrundsanschauungen”
(Husserl 1913, 61–64, here p. 62: a “ﬁeld of background images”), and from the
diﬀerence between ﬁgure and ground he derives the diﬀerence between actuality
and potentiality. See also Merleau-Ponty 1945, 9–19.
15. Bunia even argues that the possibility to diﬀerentiate and to combine analog and
digital encoding is the precondition of any complex cultural evolution (Bunia
2012, 15–16).
16. This desire has something in common with the evocation of “presence” that
Gumbrecht claims to be the core of all philological eﬀorts: What philology
evokes is the presence of textual features which, as pure ornaments, might other-
wise seem to be absent (Gumbrecht 2003). With regard to philology’s relation to
the language of desire and language cf. Hamacher 2009.
17. See Wegmann 2000 for a short characteristic of philology’s aesthetic founda-
tions.
18. The history of literary criticism has always been determined by such dichotomies,
among which the dichotomy between “scientiﬁc” and aesthetic approaches and
the dichotomy between “scientiﬁc” and pedagogical demands are the most prom-
inent (cf. Wegmann 1994).
19. For the original concept of cognition theory see Abelson 1976, 33: A script is “a
coherent sequence of events expected by the individual, involving him either as a
participant or as the observer.” See also Schank & Abelson 1977.
20. For a classical overview, see Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952; more recently Baecker
2001a.
21. These two concepts echo the fact that “culture” negates both the natural deter-
minateness of human behavior and its full autonomy (cf. Eagleton 2000, 4–5).
22. It is important to see that this description of “cultural identity” avoids the con-
ventional dialectics of “self ” and “other” which suggests that the “self” can only
be constituted in its diﬀerence from the “other.” Cultural identity is instead
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deﬁned as the result of a second order observation: One notices that diﬀerences
between ﬁgures and ornaments can also be made diﬀerently and takes this diﬀer-
ent mode of diﬀerentiation as characteristic of a diﬀerent cultural identity. Any
such observation, of course, immediately changes the “own” and potentially also
the “other” mode of diﬀerentiation, thus at the same time drawing and blurring
a boundary. Authors such as Bhabha are therefore right in putting concepts such
as “hybridity” or “in-between-ness” at the center of their theory (Bhabha 2000,
139–170). For questions of cultural identity see also Baecker 2001b, 50–53, 104–
111, and Dembeck 2010.
23. Cf. Malinowski’s claim that there cannot be a dysfunctional cultural object (Mal-
inowski 2002, 27–29).
24. For a striking account of this concept and its inherent ambivalences, contradic-
tions, and problems, see Hamacher 1997.
25. For an elaborated account of this theses, based on Lotman’s theory of the literary
text and Luhmann’s description of modern art, see Dembeck 2007b, 424–437.
26. Cf. Benne 2009, 209: “Die sogenannte Rephilologisierung der philologischen
Fa¨cher tut der Philologie keinen Gefallen, wenn sie um der Gemu¨tsruhe willen
aus ‘der Theorie’ sich zuru¨ckzieht” (“The so-called ‘re-philologization’ of the
philological disciplines will not do philology a favor if it gives up ‘theory’ for the
sake of its peace of mind.”).
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